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1 
An Indigent Criminal Defendant Is 
Entitled to “An Expert of His Own” 
Fredrick E. Vars* 
Abstract 
The Supreme Court recently heard the case of an Alabama 
death row inmate, James McWilliams.  A thus far overlooked 
argument could save his life and help level the playing field in other 
capital cases.  The Court in 1985 promised independent expertise.  
Now is its chance to make good on that promise. 
  
                                                                                                        
*  Professor, University of Alabama School of Law.  Thanks to David Patton 
and Monique Fields for helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
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The Supreme Court recently heard arguments in the appeal of 
an Alabama death row inmate, James McWilliams.1 An overlooked 
argument could save his life and help level the playing field in 
other capital cases. 
McWilliams was charged with rape and murder.2 He could not 
afford a lawyer, so one was assigned to him by the court.3 Before 
trial, his lawyer asked for and was granted a psychiatric 
evaluation.4 McWilliams, on psychotropic medication at trial, was 
convicted.5 Just two days prior to the judicial sentencing hearing, 
the state produced an expert report stating that McWilliams 
suffered from “cortical dysfunction attributable to right cerebral 
hemisphere dysfunction.”6 
At the hearing, McWilliams’s attorney requested a 
continuance to get a second opinion from an independent expert, 
so as to understand both the report and the voluminous mental 
health records that were produced by the state at the last minute.7 
That request was denied.8 As a result, McWilliams presented only 
his own and his mother’s testimony during the sentencing phase.9 
Both described McWilliams’s head trauma and poor mental 
health.10 In rebuttal, the state presented its own experts’ mental 
health testimony.11 An aggravating factor is a prerequisite for a 
death sentence, so the state also offered evidence of three such 
factors, including a past felony conviction.12 The judge sentenced 
McWilliams to death.13 
The question presented now is whether a 1985 Supreme Court 
                                                                                                        
 1.  McWilliams v. Dunn, No. 16-5294 (S. Ct. argued Apr. 24, 2017). 
 2.  Brief for Petitioner at 5, McWilliams v. Dunn, No. 16-5294 (S. Ct. Feb. 
27, 2017), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_ 
court_preview/briefs_2016_2017/16-5294_pet.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. at 8. 
 7.  Id. at 9. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. at 5. 
 10.  Id. at 5–6. 
 11.  Id. at 6. 
 12.  Id. at 12. 
 13.  Id. 
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case, Ake v. Oklahoma,14 clearly established that an indigent 
defendant who needs an expert is entitled to one who is 
independent of the prosecution. The parties have presented 
competing views of Ake,15 which were thoroughly vetted at oral 
argument.16   
McWilliams has the stronger argument. The motivating 
principle of Ake is to “assure a proper functioning of the adversary 
process.”17 Consistent with that principle, Ake speaks of 
“psychiatrists for each party.”18 This is more than a passing 
reference. Later, the Court explained that the defense expert 
should “assist in preparing the cross-examination of a State’s 
psychiatric witnesses.”19 This obviously makes no sense if the 
defense expert is also the state’s expert. Clearly, the defense expert 
must be independent.20 
This clarity is not diminished by Ake’s statement that a 
defendant has no “constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of 
his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own.”21 Out of 
context, one might infer from this statement that defendants are 
not entitled to experts of their own. But the Court immediately 
slams the door on this inference, explaining that the right to an 
expert is analogous to the right to counsel.22 Indigent defendants 
can obviously be assigned attorneys rather than be given money to 
                                                                                                        
 14.  470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
 15.  See generally Brief for Petitioner, McWilliams v. Dunn, No. 16-5294 (S. 
Ct. Feb. 27, 2017); Brief for Respondent, McWilliams v. Dunn, No. 16-5294 (S. Ct. 
Mar. 29, 2017); Reply Brief of Petitioner, McWilliams v. Dunn, No. 16-5294 (S. 
Ct. Apr. 17, 2017). These briefs are available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/preview_home/2016_2017_briefs/16-
5294.html. 
 16.  See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, McWilliams v. Dunn, No. 
16-5294 (S. Ct. 2017), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_ 
transcripts/2016/16-5294_g314.pdf. 
 17.  Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (emphasis added). 
 18.  Id. at 81. 
 19.  Id. at 82. 
 20.  See Carlton Bailey, Ake v. Oklahoma and an Indigent Defendant's 
‘Right’ to an Expert Witness: A Promise Denied or Imagined?, 10 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 401, 458 (2002) (arguing that “courts which hold that Ake may be satisfied 
by a neutral expert . . . misread Ake”). 
 21.  Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985). 
 22.  See id. at 76 (discussing the right to counsel as part of a defendant’s 
right to meaningful access to justice). 
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hire one of their choosing.23 Still, an assigned attorney must 
zealously and independently pursue the defendant’s interests, not 
those of the prosecution.24 A court retains the authority to deny 
funds for a particular expert, but not to deny an expert altogether. 
But another strong argument for McWilliams remains hidden 
in plain sight. All of the discussion above involves a defendant’s 
right to an expert on the question of insanity in the guilt phase of 
trial. In a separate section, Ake left no doubt that an indigent 
criminal defendant is entitled to “an expert of his own” “when the 
State presents psychiatric evidence of the defendant’s future 
dangerousness” during capital sentencing.25 Allowing psychiatric 
evidence of future dangerousness, the Court explained, is premised 
on a defendant being able to present “the opposing views of the 
defendant’s doctors” and “a well-informed expert’s opposing 
view.”26 Moreover, the expert assistance for defendant is to include 
“assistance in preparation at the sentencing phase.”27 
There are good reasons the parties and the Court missed the 
relevance of this proposition for McWilliams. First, the state in 
McWilliams did not expressly assert future dangerousness.28 But 
it no less injected future dangerousness into the case by 
introducing evidence of a prior felony conviction.29 Felony 
convictions are often relied upon to establish future 
                                                                                                        
 23.  See John M. West, Expert Services and the Indigent Criminal Defendant: 
The Constitutional Mandate of Ake v. Oklahoma, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1326, 1346 
(1986) (arguing that “in all respects except the defendant's free choice of his 
expert, a ‘partisan’ expert is constitutionally required”). 
 24.  See Paul C. Giannelli, The Right to Defense Experts, 18 CRIM. JUST. 15, 
18 (2003) (analogizing the right to a defense expert with the right to defense 
counsel). 
 25.  Ake, 470 U.S. at 83, 84; cf. Ralph Slovenko, Post-Ake Developments on 
the Right to Psychiatric Assistance, 23 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 605, 613 (1995) (“Justice 
Marshall divided the Ake analysis to address separately the guilt and the 
sentencing phases of the trial.”). 
 26.  Ake, 470 U.S. at 84 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Roberson v. Director, TDCJ-CID, No. 2:09cv327, 2014 WL 5343198, at *23 
(E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2014) (“Trial counsel presented a sound trial strategy on the 
issue of future dangerousness. He presented an expert to counter the State's 
experts and vigorously cross-examined the State's experts.”). 
 27.  Ake, 470 U.S. at 84. 
 28.  See generally Brief for Petitioner, McWilliams v. Dunn, No. 16-5294 (S. 
Ct. Feb. 27, 2017). 
 29.  Id. at 5.  
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dangerousness,30 and criminal history is a proxy for future 
offending.31 The past felony conviction implied that McWilliams 
was, and would continue to be, a recidivist. 
Second, future dangerousness was not a statutory aggravator 
in Alabama,32 whereas it was in Oklahoma at the time of Ake.33 
This is a distinction without a difference. Whether future 
dangerousness appears in a statute or comes in by another path is 
irrelevant.34 Either way (like a misdiagnosis in mitigation), it may 
determine whether a defendant lives or dies.  
Third, the state did not rely initially on psychiatric evidence, 
but presented it only in rebuttal.35 This distinction too is 
immaterial.36 McWilliams’s mental health was an issue well before 
sentencing and by far the most powerful mitigating factor. There 
was no doubt McWilliams would introduce mental health evidence, 
so the state had its mental health experts ready for rebuttal. 
Surely, the state cannot avoid Ake by reserving its psychiatric 
evidence for certain introduction later.   
Fourth, the state’s psychiatric evidence did not go directly to 
future dangerousness. Instead, the state used its experts to argue 
that McWilliams was faking his mental illness.37 That may seem 
like a significant distinction given Ake’s focus on predicting future 
dangerousness.38 But elsewhere the opinion recognizes that 
psychiatrists also “disagree widely and frequently on what 
constitutes mental illness” and “on the appropriate diagnosis to be 
                                                                                                        
 30.  See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 (2002) (“To prove future 
dangerousness, the State relied on [defendant’s] prior felony convictions as well 
as the testimony of four victims of earlier robberies and assaults.”). 
 31.  BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND 
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 188 (2007). 
 32.  See generally ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49 (1975).  
 33.  Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 86 (1985). 
 34.  Buttrum v. Black, 721 F. Supp. 1268, 1311 n.9 (N.D. Ga. 1989) 
(discussing future dangerousness as an aggravating factor). 
 35.  Brief for Petitioner at 5, McWilliams v. Dunn, No. 16-5294 (S. Ct. Feb. 
27, 2017). 
 36.  See Castro v. Oklahoma, 71 F.3d 1502, 1514–1515 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(finding that the Ake duty to provide a defense expert is triggered anytime the 
State presents evidence of future dangerousness). 
 37.  Brief for Petitioner at 7, McWilliams v. Dunn, No. 16-5294 (S. Ct. Feb. 
27, 2017). 
 38.  See generally Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 84 (1985). 
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attached to given behavior.”39 Detecting false symptoms is 
particularly difficult.40 Expertise is as critical here, and the stakes 
are the same, as with future dangerousness. 
When these factors are properly understood, it is even clearer 
Ake established that McWilliams was entitled to an independent 
expert. 
Why are independent experts particularly important in 
capital sentencing? Ake explains that “[t]he State . . . has a 
profound interest in assuring that its ultimate sanction is not 
erroneously imposed.”41 In capital sentencing, mitigation evidence 
can directly tip the scale for or against death. Conviction of a crime, 
on the other hand, cannot lead automatically to a sentence of 
death.42 Rather, a death sentence may be imposed only after 
consideration of all factors, including “the character and record of 
the individual offender.”43 This is a well-established constitutional 
requirement, whereas the Court has not decided whether the 
insanity defense is constitutionally required.44 
These considerations indicate that the Ake duty to provide an 
independent expert should cover sentencing in every death penalty 
case.45 The state should be required to provide a psychiatric expert 
even when future dangerousness is not squarely at issue. 
“[P]sychiatric testimony is generally of critical importance to the 
sentencing determination, covering issues of rehabilitative 
                                                                                                        
 39.  Id. at 81. 
 40.  See Phillip J. Resnick & James Knoll, Faking It: How to Detect 
Malingered Psychosis, 4 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY 12, 14 (2005) (“No other syndrome 
is as easy to define yet so difficult to diagnose as malingering.”). 
 41.  Ake, 470 U.S. at 83–84; see also id. at 87 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“In 
capital cases the finality of the sentence imposed warrants protections that may 
or may not be required in other cases.”). 
 42.  See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976) (finding that a 
mandatory death sentence statute violates the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments). 
 43.  Id. at 304 (plurality opinion). 
 44.  See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 752 n.20 (2006) (“We have never held 
that the Constitution mandates an insanity defense, nor have we held that the 
Constitution does not so require.”). 
 45.  See Susan S. Brown, After Ake: Implementing the Tools of an Adequate 
Defense, 7 PACE L. REV. 201, 240–41 (1986) (“For psychiatric defense assistance 
at a capital sentencing proceeding, a defendant need not make the same threshold 
showing as must be made to obtain such assistance at trial.”). 
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potential, future dangerousness, and individual culpability.”46 And 
not just psychiatric evidence is essential. In all capital cases, 
“because the defendant’s medical, psychological, sociological, and 
family background must all be thoroughly investigated, counsel 
must seek out assistance from mitigation specialists.”47 Not 
providing indigent defendants this assistance thwarts their efforts 
to marshal mitigating evidence.   
Another Supreme Court case, Wiggins v. Smith,48 is 
instructive. In that case, the Court sustained a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel because the defense attorney failed to 
adequately investigate social history and therefore failed to 
uncover powerful evidence of sexual abuse.49 One commentator 
correctly observed that, “[a]t a key point in its opinion, the Court 
chastised defense counsel for failing to ‘commission’ a social history 
report ‘[d]espite the fact that the Public Defender’s office made 
funds available for the retention of a forensic social worker.’”50 In 
other words, the Court instructed defense counsel to “commission” 
an expert report, not just rely on the state’s expert. A 
constitutional duty to gather mitigating evidence is meaningful 
only if indigent defendants are provided with independent expert 
help.51 
Independent experts are especially important when mental 
health is involved. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized 
that mental health is relevant in death penalty cases.52 But mental 
                                                                                                        
 46.  Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 264 (1988) (Marshall, J., 
concurring). 
 47.  Craig M. Cooley, Mapping the Monster's Mental Health and Social 
History: Why Capital Defense Attorneys and Public Defender Death Penalty Units 
Require the Services of Mitigation Specialists, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 23, 53 
(2005); cf. Fredrick E. Vars, Prosecutorial Misconduct: The Best Defense Is a Good 
Defense, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 465, 469 (2016) (arguing that “one key 
component of support should be mitigation specialists”). 
 48.  539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 49.  Id. at 523–27. 
 50.  Constitutional Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 278, 284 (2003) (quoting Wiggins, 
539 U.S. at 524). 
 51.  See id. at 287 (arguing that Ake and Wiggins signal that “the 
Constitution requires the retention of mitigation specialists” in every capital 
sentencing). 
 52.  See Michael L. Perlin, “Merchants and Thieves, Hungry for Power”: 
Prosecutorial Misconduct and Passive Judicial Complicity in Death Penalty 
Trials of Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 1501 
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health evidence is more than just relevant in capital sentencing—
it is essential. The Court has held that the absence of an 
instruction informing the jury that it could consider as mitigating 
the defendant’s mental condition, which arguably made him less 
culpable, violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.53 The 
Court has also held that counsel’s failure to uncover and present 
evidence of defendant’s mental health at the penalty phase of a 
death penalty case was ineffective assistance of counsel.54 Holding 
that mental health evidence is essential in mitigation without 
providing indigent defendants a genuine opportunity to uncover 
and present such evidence undermines the properly functioning 
“adversary process” that Ake is meant to protect.55 
The Court in Ake promised independent expertise at least in 
capital sentencing. It has a chance now to make good on that 
promise, and perhaps save a life in the process. 
                                                                                                        
(2016) (citing Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 
U.S. 930 (2007); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 
U.S. 399 (1986)). 
 53.  Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 322–328 (1989), rev’d on other grounds 
sub nom. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 54.  Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 38–40 (2009); accord Wiggins v. Smith, 
539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 55.  Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985). 
